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Abstract Fast Flux service networks (FFSNs) are used by adversaries to
achieve a high resilient technique for their malicious servers while keeping
them hidden from direct access. In this technique, a large number of botnet
machines, that are known as flux agents, work as proxies to relay the traffic
between end users and a malicious mothership server which is controlled by
an adversary. Various mechanisms have been proposed for detecting FFSNs.
Such mechanisms depend on collecting a large amount of DNS traffic traces
and require a considerable amount of time to identify fast flux domains. In this
paper, we propose an efficient AI-based online fast flux detection system that
performs highly accurate and extremely fast detection of fast flux domains.
The proposed system, called PASSVM, is based on features that are associ-
ated with DNS response messages of a given domain name. The approach relies
on features that are stored in two local databases, in addition to features that
are extracted from the response DNS messages itself. The information in the
databases are obtained from Censys search engine and IP Geolocation service.
PASSVM is evaluated using three types of artificial neural networks which
are: Multilayer Perceptron (MLP), Radial Basis Function Network (RBF),
and Support Vector Machines (SVM). Results show that SVM with RBF ker-
nel outperformed the other two methods with an accuracy of 99.557% and a
detection time of less than 18 ms.
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1 Introduction
The Domain Name System (DNS) is a core Internet infrastructure element
that is implemented as a distributed hierarchical database and is viewed as a
crucial backbone of the Internet. It mainly provides a mapping between do-
main names and their IP addresses, in addition to other important functions
that are necessary for the proper functions of websites. At the same time,
DNS plays an integral part in the operation of different types of attacks and
malicious activities such as DNS amplification attacks [1] [2], DNS cache poi-
soning attacks [3] [4], malware distribution [5], and botnets [6] [7]. As millions
of new domain names are registered every day, there is a growing concern that
many of these domains might belong to botnets and various types of malicious
activities.
Botnets represent a significant threat that is continuously evolving with
new techniques and architectures. They are used to perform different types of
malicious activities such as distributed denial of service attacks, email spam,
phishing, and malware distribution. Botherders are continuously developing
techniques to hide their malicious activities and to evade detection. Attackers
rely on DNS to resolve IP addresses of domain names (e.g., phishing domains,
command and control (C&C) servers, etc.) that are used in their attacks.
Therefore, it is clear that DNS provides an important information that can
reveal different attack activities.
Fast Flux Service Networks (FFSNs) are spacial forms of botnets that are
mainly designed to provide resilient and highly available service while evading
detection. It is a technique that is adopted by botmasters since 2007 with an
increasing activity rate in recent years. The main purpose of fast flux networks
is to hide the content server (also called the mothership server), where the
malicious content is hosted behind a botnet of compromised machines that
are called flux agents. Flux agents are configured by the botmaster in order to
serve as proxies that relay traffic to/from the origin server. Similar to content
distribution networks (CDNs), FFSNs achieve a high availability by using a
technique that mimics the Round Robin Domain Name System (RRDNS) to
map domain names and IP addresses of flux agents. In FFSNs, a fast flux
domain is mapped to multiple IP addresses that keep changing very fast. This
increases the chances that the origin server is reachable from some of the flux
agents that are still running and have not blacklisted yet.
The Internet Honeynet project was the first to systemically describe the
problem of fast flux networks and their main features [8]. Subsequently, the
research community paid more attention to this growing threat and several
mechanisms were proposed to address the problem. With the renewed adoption
of fast flux networks in major botnets (e.g., SandiFlux [9] and DarkCloud [10]),
new fast flux detection mechanisms were proposed in recent years (e.g., [11]
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[12]). Most of these mechanisms rely on analyzing DNS traffic information
that corresponds to fast flux domains in order to characterize their behavior
and identify their distinguishing features. In this regard, DNS records can be
obtained actively by issuing DNS requests about domain names of fast flux
domains that are obtained from email spam campaigns and phishing archives,
or through the analysis of passively collected DNS traffic traces.
Detecting fast flux networks accurately and instantly (i.e., online detection)
is an important and a challenging problem. While some previously proposed
mechanisms have achieved high detection rate, they require long time to collect
DNS and other related information from different sources. In this paper, we
propose a novel and efficient AI-based online fast flux detection system. The
main goal of the proposed system (PASSVM) is to perform online fast flux de-
tection based on a single DNS response message for a given domain name. To
achieve this goal, we investigated different Artificial Neural Networks (ANN)
models and trained them using features that are stored locally. The features
information are based on the A records that are found in the DNS response
message. This means that we restrict our feature set to the information that
is available in the DNS response itself or can be obtained from local databases
that can be downloaded in advance. Therefore, well-known fast flux features
that require any form of active query are not needed. The first database is
constructed from data that is downloaded in advance from Censys search en-
gine and includes historical information about IPv4 address space. The second
database is constructed in advance using data from IP geolocation service [13]
which provides IP to location and autonomous system number (ASN) infor-
mation for IP addresses that correspond to a given domain name. Specifically,
the main contributions of this paper are:
1. An efficient and highly accurate online fast flux detection system based on
features that are available in a single DNS response message.
2. Leveraging the data that is made available by Censys search engine [25]
about IPv4 address space and data from IP geolocation service.
3. Two new fast flux features that allow for online fast flux detection are pro-
posed. The two features are based on the database that can be downloaded
from Censys search engine.
4. The proposed system is evaluated using three types of artificial neural
network models which are: Multilayer Perceptron (MLP), Radial Basis
Function Network (RBF), and Support Vector Machines (SVM). SVM
with RBF kernel outperformed the other two methods with an accuracy of
99.557% and a detection time of less than 18 ms.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents
a background about fast flux networks. In section 3, we discuss the related
work. In section 4, we present the proposed PASSVM system. In Section 5, we
discuss different ANN models that are used in the evaluation of the proposed
approach. In Section 6, we evaluate our system and discuss the performance of
different ANN models based on recent datasets. The conclusion of the paper
is given in section 7.
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2 Fast Flux Networks
Round robin DNS and content distribution networks (CDNs) are two main
techniques that are employed by web servers to achieve load balancing and
high availability. In round robin DNS, the authoritative domain name server
of a certain domain name is configured to distribute the workload to multiple
redundant web servers by mapping the host name of the web server to multiple
IP addresses. This mapping keeps changing in a round robin fashion. Each time
a client issues a DNS query, the client may obtain a list of IP addresses for
the given host name in different order. In CDNs, the content is pushed to a
large number of geographically distributed servers. Global load balancing is
achieved by providing the client with set of IP addresses of nearby servers. For
example, a user in USA, who is trying to access a CDN hosted website, sends
a DNS query for that web site, and will get a reply with a set of IP addresses
of servers that are hosted in nearby locations within the CDN.
FFSNs employ similar techniques in order to provide a high availability of
malicious servers while hiding their real locations. Figure 1 shows the main
stages of constructing and operating a fast flux service network. Initially, the
botnet herder sets up a mothership server in order to host some sort of mali-
cious content for the purpose of malware distribution, illegal pharmaceutical
products sale, or hosting adult content, etc. (step 1). A domain name, such
as xyz.com, is assigned for this server. Then, a botnet of fast flux agents is
formed and each agent is configured to serve as a proxy server to relay traffic
to/from the mothership server (step 2). Flux agents are mainly compromised
machines with intermittent connectivity, limited computational power, and
low to average bandwidth.
Afterwards, the botnet herder registers the domain name of the FFSN
with a set of IP addresses that belong to the fast flux agents botnet (step 3).
Therefore, any access to the malicious FFSN domain should go through one
of the flux agents that is returned to the client by the DNS system (step 4). It
is clear that the botnet of flux agents forms a protection layer for the hidden
malicious server. In order to increase the resilience of the network and to evade
detection, the botnet herder keeps changing the domain name registration in
a fast manner. This type of FFSNs is called a single-flux. There is a more
sophisticated type, that is called double-flux, in which the botnet herder also
changes the mapping between the authoritative name server of the FFSN and
its IP addresses in a fast manner. Therefore, providing a layer of protection
for the FFSN’ authoritative name server.
Figures 2 and 3 show the DNS lookup result that is obtained using the
Unix dig utility for the fast flux domain (flowjob.top.). It can be seen that this
fast flux domain is mapped to multiple IP addresses and the mapping keeps
on changing over time. For example, the second dig, which was performed
150 seconds after the first one, showed a new set of IP addresses that did
not appear in the first dig output, which is a common characteristic of fast
flux networks. Previous research studies have identified several features that
mainly characterize fast flux domains [15] [11]. These features include:
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Fig. 1 Stages of the life cycle of fast flux service network
– Large number of IP addresses. The number of A records that is included
within a single DNS response message of a fast flux domain is relatively
large. If one or more of the fast flux agents that are associated with the
IP addresses are down, a client, that is trying to access the mothership
server of the associated domain name, would automatically try another
IP address (i.e., another agent) until it succeeds. Registering the domain
name with a large number of IP addresses provides high availability of the
malicious server as it increases the probability that one of the flux agents
is up and running.
– Large IP growth. In order to avoid blacklisting, the mapping, between a
fast flux domain and agent IP addresses, keeps on changing over time.
Therefore, the number of IP addresses, that are associated with a certain
fast flux domain, becomes large.
– Low TTL value. Since the mapping between a domain name and IP ad-
dresses changes very fast in FFSNs, then the TTL values are kept low.
This guarantees that the values expire soon after the fast flux domain is
resolved in order for users to obtain the new list of IP addresses.
– Large number of autonomous systems. The IP addresses, that are returned
in response to a DNS query for a fast flux domain, represent compro-
mised machines that belong to different organizations and Internet Service
Providers. Therefore, it is expected that IP addresses of these agents belong
to multiple autonomous systems.
– Large number of countries. Previous studies showed that the IP addresses of
fast flux domains are usually located in relatively large number of countries.
This is expected since attackers register their fast flux domains with a set
of IP addressees that are selected randomly from a pool of fast flux agents.
– Domain names do not last for a long time. The life time of a fast flux
domain is relatively short. Attackers tend to register a large number of
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Fig. 2 Output of the first dig of the fast flux domain flowjob.top. (performed on April 22
2019)
Fig. 3 Output of the second dig of the fast flux domain flowjob.top. (performed on April
22 2019)
domains for their FFSNs, where each domain name remains active for a
short period of time.
3 Related Work
Most of the previous work in the area of fast flux detection (e.g., [16] [17]
[18] [19]) have focused mainly on analyzing DNS traffic traces. Some meth-
ods performed active DNS probing to collect DNS records about suspect do-
mains; while other methods used DNS records that were collected passively.
Active and passive DNS information collection are usually combined with other
information that is collected from different sources such as whois database,
IP2location services, and blacklisted domains. In addition, some information
are based on active measurements of the delay and other parameters.
Characterization of fast flux networks was first presented in [8] and [20]. In
these studies, active DNS-based approach was proposed where the DNS system
was queried actively for domain names that were collected from Internet Spam
archives and obtained by means of spam traps. DNS A records were analyzed
by searching for fast flux domain footprints. These studies provided important
insight about the nature of this threat and identified the main characteristics of
fast flux domains such as such as low TTL values, large number of IP addresses,
geographical distribution of flux agents, sharing of flux agents, and sharing of
scam web pages. In [20], a metric, which is called fluxy-score, is defined and
computed over a set of parameters that are related to DNS records for a certain
domain in order to determine whether the domain is a fast flux domain or a
legitimate.
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Konte, Feamster, and Jung revealed similar characteristics and provided
an insight about the dynamics of scam hosting infrastructure with a focus on
the role of fast flux service networks [15]. Other studies (e.g., [21] [22]) have
focused on botnet detection through fast flux identification. The main problem
of active DNS-based detection of fast flux networks is that it incurs high delay
because it requires long time to collect DNS records for suspicious domain
names. Also, the high rate of DNS queries that is received by authoritative
domain name servers, that are under attackers’ direct control, may alert them
about such activity.
Other fast flux detection mechanisms (e.g., [43] [11]) relied on passive DNS
monitoring, where DNS A records are obtained in a passive manner through
monitoring DNS traffic. In [43], live DNS traffic traces were captured by placing
sensors at various strategic locations within an ISP network. The c4.5 decision
tree classifier was applied on a set of features that are extracted from the traces
and other features that are obtained actively. The reported results showed a
high false positive rate and a long detection time due to the requirement
of monitoring domains for a long period of time (five days in some cases).
The work presented in [11] followed a similar approach where DNS traffic
traces were collected from a large corporate network. Mathematical and data
mining techniques were applied on a set of features that are extracted from
the monitored traffic in order to achieve near real-time fast flux detection.
A system called Fast-flux hunter was proposed in [12]. The system combines
supervised and unsupervised online knowledge learning based system for fast
flux detection based on features extracted from passive DNS traffic. In [?], a
hybrid fast flux detection method that combines real-time detection and ong
term DNS traffic analysis and monitoring was proposed. The method employed
a decision tree classifier to achieve an accuracy rate close to 96%.
Generally, a passive fast flux detection approach does not involve direct
interaction with the domain name system. This has the advantage of elimi-
nating network delays in obtaining DNS records. Also it prevents false DNS
replies that can be provided by attackers who might be controlling author-
itative domain name servers while observing a large number of DNS quires.
Moreover, it has the advantage of discovering fast flux domains that could po-
tentially appear in different malicious sources such as phishing emails, hackers
forums, and online social networks. However, this approach requires processing
a huge amount of DNS traffic traces that contain different types of information
regarding malicious domains and legitimate domains.
The approach presented in [24] does not rely mainly on collecting DNS
information. Instead, it relies on certain intrinsic characteristics of fast flux
networks with the observation that it is expected to have long delays when
fetching a document through a flux agent. The flux agent acts as a proxy to a
back-end mothership server. On the other hand, the required time to download
a similar content from a legitimate server is short. The scheme can detect fast
flux domains within few seconds whenever a client attempts to download a
document from a certain server. The scheme involves issuing additional HTTP
requests to verify the legitimacy of the web-server. Also it can be applied in
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an active mode to identify fast flux domains in advance. However, this scheme
has several limitations as it requires live interaction with malicious servers,
and it does not discover flux agents that are hosted on a powerful PCs. Also
it can result in many false positives in case legitimate servers are hosted at
low-level hardware.
Previous fast flux detection mechanisms suffer from major drawbacks in
the sense that they usually require considerable amount of time to actively or
passively collect information about the flux DNS. Also, the mechanisms can
not detect new fast flux domains before collecting enough data about them.
Therefore, the DNS traffic analysis requires a long time of computations in
order to achieve acceptable detection accuracy. Different than the previous
work, the proposed fast flux detection system of this paper performs an on-
the-fly highly accurate fast flux domain detection by leveraging information
about IPv4 address space that is obtained in advance and stored in local
databases. As a result, it eliminates the long-time monitoring and analysis of
the DNS traffic and makes it possible to detect fast flux domains using only a
single DNS response message.
4 The Proposed PASSVM System
4.1 Overview of the proposed system
An online fast flux detection system should be able to perform fast flux detec-
tion on the fly based on the available A records in a single DNS response mes-
sage for the domain name. In other words, the system should directly answer
whether a domain name is a fast flux domain or not without performing active
DNS probing or seeking additional information from external sources during
the decision making time. This requirement is very important to avoid delays
and prevent additional traffic overhead during the classification process. To
achieve this goal, PASSVM relies mainly on information about IPv4 addresses
that are collected in advance (for example, one day before performing fast flux
classification) from two main sources. The first source is the Censys search
engine [25], which is a search engine that performs Internet wide scanning us-
ing the Zmap fast Internet scanner [14]. Censys performs a daily IPv4 address
space scanning and can be obtained by users using special APIs. Alternatively,
Zmap can be used directly to perform the daily scanning in advance since it
has the ability to scan the whole IPv4 address space within less than one hour
[26]. The second source is the IP geolocation service [13], which provides the
mapping between IP addresses and their locations (cities and countries). It
also provides the ASN number for each IP address. IP geolocation data can be
downloaded and used locally. In addition, the proposed approach uses specific
features that are extracted from the DNS response message of the request.
Figure 4 shows the proposed system architecture. The system can be used
as a module within a local DNS resolver, where suspicious DNS requests are
inspected by the PASSVM. Any domain name, that has many IP addresses
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Fig. 4 The proposed PASSVM system architecture
(for example , more than 5 IPs), is considered a suspicious domain. As depicted
in Figure 4, a feature set is extracted from the DNS response and from the
local databases that were constructed using Censys and IP geolocation. An
artificial neural network classifier is then used to decide whether the domain
is a fast-flux domain or a legitimate domain.
4.2 Fast flux features set
In this subsection, we describe the fast flux features that are used in the
detection process of the proposed AI-based system. In order to achieve a fast
classification model, we used features that can be obtained from the locally
stored IPv4 address space information or from the DNS response message.
4.2.1 Censys-based fast flux features
Two important fast flux features that complement other known fast flux fea-
tures are introduced in this paper. Here we discuss the two new features. Given
a DNS reply of a fast flux domain name, it is expected that some of the flux
agents, of the list of IP addresses in the DNS reply, might be down at a given
time. The reason is that these agents are machines that belong to normal end
users in different organizations and can be powered off or get disconnected
from the Internet at any time. Consequently, querying Censys with a set of IP
addresses that belong to a fast-flux domain will not return information about
all the addresses in the search query. This is due to the fact that Censys data
is obtained by performing a daily Internet wide scanning for the IPv4 address
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space using Zmap fast Internet scanner, and there is a high probability that
the scanner will not find some of the fast flux agents because they are offline
at the time of the scanning. On the other hand, IP addresses that correspond
to a legitimate domain name are usually well-maintained servers. Therefore,
they are not expected to be offline and there is a high probability that they
are reachable by the Zmap scanner. This means that querying Censys with a
list of IP addresses that correspond to a legitimate domain will return infor-
mation about most of them. Hence, the ratio of IP addresses that are returned
from Censys to the number of IP addresses that are submitted in the query
represents an important feature to distinguish between fast flux domains and
legitimate domains. This is the first new feature that is introduced in this
paper.
This second important feature, that can be extracted from Censys search
results, is related to the overall number of open ports that are discovered by
Censys for the set of IP addresses of a certain domain name. In the case of a
legitimate domain name, it is expected that all hosting servers, of the same
domain, have similar configurations that result in having the same open ports
on the hosting servers. On the other hand, in the case of a fast flux domain,
there is a high chance that other port numbers are open, in addition to the
ones that are configured by the attacker. This is because the configuration of
the infected machines in the FFSNs are heterogeneous and belong to many
different users. Hence, the number of open port numbers can indicate whether
a domain name is a fast flux or a legitimate domain.
For illustration, Figure 5 shows the results that are returned from the Cen-
sys search engine for a set of IP addresses that belong to the fast-flux domain
(hex001.info.). Censys has returned information about 7 IP addresses out
of the 10 IP addresses that were submitted in the query. On the other hand,
Figure 6 shows the results that are returned from the Censys search engine
for a set of IP addresses that belong to the legitimate domain (uefa.com.).
As shown in the figure, Censys has returned information about all of the IP
addresses that were submitted in the query. Hence, the IP ratio of the fast-
flux domain (hex001.info.) is 0.7, and the IP ratio of the legitimate domain
(uefa.com.) is 1.0. In addition, the figures show the number of open ports of
the IP addresses in the query. For the fast flux domain, there are five distinct
open port numbers (Ports 443, 3389, 1433, 5432, and 80). However, for the
legitimate domain there is only one open port number (Port 443). Hence, the
number of open ports of fast flux domains is relatively greater than that of
legitimate domains.
In summary, the two newly introduced features for fast-flux detection are:
– IP ratio: The ratio of the number of IP addresses that is returned from
Censys to the number of IP addresses that is submitted in the query.
– Ports: The number of distinct open port protocols for all of the IP addresses
that are returned from Censys search engine.
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Fig. 5 Example of the results that are returned by Censys for 10 IP addresses of the fast
flux domain hex001.info. (performed on December 7 2019)
4.2.2 IP geolocation-based features
Censys search engine provides information about geographical distribution of
the IP addresses in a query to its database. This includes information such
as countries, cites, and ASN numbers. However, sometimes Censys does not
necessarily provide this information about all of the IP addresses that are
found in a given DNS response. Therefore, IP geolocation service is used to
obtain the information for all of IP addresses in a DNS response message that
belongs to a given domain name. In particular, we define the following three
features that are based on the number of countries and the number of ASNs
provided by the IP geolocation service:
1. ASNratio: This feature is defined as the ratio of the number of distinct
ASNs for the set of IP addresses in a given DNS response message to the
12 Basheer Al-Duwairi* et al.
Fig. 6 Example of the results that are returned by Censys for 20 IP addresses of the
legitimate domain uefa.com. (performed on December 7 2019)
total number of IP addresses in the DNS response. For example, if the
number of IP addresses that is returned in a DNS response message for
a certain domain is 10, and the IPs belong to 5 distinct ASNs, then the
ASNratio equals to 0.5.
2. Regions: This feature defines the number of distinct countries for all of IP
addresses in a given DNS response message.
3. RegionalSpread: This feature is defined as the ratio of the number of dis-
tinct countries, for all of IP addresses in a given DNS response message,
to the number of IP addresses in the response message.
4.2.3 DNS-Response based features
The DNS response message itself contains important features that contribute
significantly in distinguishing fast-flux domains. This includes the following
features:
1. DomainLeangth: This feature is defined as the number of characters in
the domain name. Usually, malicious domains, including fast flux domains,
have long domain names. Therefore, the domain name length is included
as one of the features for fast flux detection.
2. IPCount: This feature is defined as the number of A records that are found
in a DNS response message for a given domain. As explained in Section 2,
this number is expected to be relatively large for fast flux domains.
3. TTL This feature is defined as the TTL value for the DNS reply message
for a given domain. As explained in Section 2, fast flux domains usually
have very short TTL values.
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Table 1 The main features that are used in the system
first second third
F1 DomainLength The length of a domain name
F2 Regions The number of countries where the IPs are located
F3 Ports The overall number of open ports for all of the IPs
F4 IPCount The number of IP addresses in a DNS response message
F5 IP ratio The ratio of the returned IPs (by Censys) to the number of IPs in the DNS response message
F6 TTL The TTL value of the DNS response message
F7 ASN The ratio of the number of distinct ASNs to the number of IPs in the DNS response message
F8 RegionalSpread The ratio of the number of distinct countries to the number of IPs the DNS response message
Table 1 summarizes the main features that are used in the proposed system
for fast flux detection. In total, 8 features are used. The system obtains the
features from the DNS response message or from two databases that are stored
locally. The information in the databases are obtained from Censys and IP
geolocation services. Clearly, it is possible to perform the online and highly
accurate fast flux detection using the proposed approach .
5 Classification Methods
Artificial Neural Network (ANN) models have been used widely for classifi-
cation of data into classes. These models are powerful tools for supervised
machine learning where a model can classify a data input into one of classes.
During the training of an ANN model, data inputs are vectors of values and
their corresponding classes. In our learning approach, vectors of the selected
features along with their classes (Fast Flux or Legitimate domain) have been
used to train the ANN models. 10-fold method is used on the input data for
training and validation. Three types of ANN models were used which are:
Multilayer Perceptron (MLP) or Feedforward Neural Network, Radial Basis
Function Network (RBF), and Support Vector Machines (SVM). SVM out-
performed the other two methods. Below is a brief review about each one of
the ANNs.
5.1 MLP and RBF neural networks
In MLP, the feature input vector k (xk) is multiplied by the weight matrix
(W) and a bias vector (bk) is added to the product [27]. Then an activation
function f is applied to rescale the result to a value between 0 and 1. Different
activation functions can be used such as the Sigmoid and the Softmax functions
[28] [29]. Figure 7 depicts a general MLP network. Hence, the output of the
network is calculated using Equation 1.
output = f(Wxk + bk) (1)
14 Basheer Al-Duwairi* et al.
Feature 1
Feature 2
Feature 3
Feature 
(n-1)
Feature 
(n)
.
.
.
Class 0
Class 1
Activation 
function
Neuron 1
Neuron 2
Neuron 3
𝐖
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vector (bk)
xk
f
Output
Fig. 7 Structure of a Multilayer Perceptron Network
Softmax function has also shown high performance when it is used as the
activation function. Softmax function is given in Equation 2 and has been used
for the output layer in our experiments.
g(ax) =
exp(ax)
K∑
i=1
exp(ai)
(2)
On another hand, Radial Basis Function (RBF) networks applies radial
functions h(.) on the input vector (xk). A popular radial function that is
widely used is the Gaussian function which is shown in Equation 3. c is a
center point where the function decreases or increases monotonically based on
the distance from c. r is the function radius.
h(x) = exp
(
− (x− c)
2
r2
)
(3)
In RBF networks, the hidden layer represents the radial functions as shown
in Figure 8. Softmax or Gaussian activation functions can be used. Both func-
tions were used in our experiments as we will discuss in the evaluation section.
If Gaussian basis function is used, the output of the network is computed using
Equation 4 [30] [31] [32].
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Fig. 8 Structure of a Radial Basis Function Network
output =
∑
j
(
wj × exp
(
− (x− c)
2
r2
))
(4)
IBM SPSS tool was used in our experiments for both MLP and RBF nural
networks. The identity function g(x) = x is used for the output layer of the
RBF network.
5.2 SVM and RBF kernel
Support Vector Machine (SVM) finds a separating hyperplane with the maxi-
mum margin of separation. In other words, it computes the maximum distance
between the separating hyperplane and the closest data points (support vec-
tors). The design of a single neuron for fast flux detection can be interpreted as
a classification problem. Therefore, the synthesis of fast flux detection neural
network can be solved by a set of n independent SVMs; where n is the number
of neurons in the neural network [33].
During training of the SVM ANN, (xk, yk), k = 1, 2, ,m represent the
feature training patterns. Each feature input vector xk ∈ Rn belongs to one
of two classes (yk = -1 or +1). -1 is a fast flux domain and +1 is a legitimate
domain. Assuming the feature vectors are linearly separable, there exists a
separating hyperplane as depicted in Equation 5.
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yk(w
Txk + b) > 0, k = 1, 2, ...,m (5)
The weights w and the bias b vector can be rescaled to get Equation 6.
yk(w
Txk + b) ≥ 0, k = 1, 2, ...,m (6)
The corresponding weights and bias represent the optimal hyperplane. To
compute the optimality using Lagrange multipliers α1...αm, the objective func-
tion is to minimize Equation 7.
J(α) =
m∑
k=1
αk − 1
2
m∑
k=1
m∑
j=1
αkαjykyj(x
k)Txj (7)
subject to:
m∑
k=1
αkyk = 0
αk ≥ 0, k = 1, 2, ...,m
(8)
Solving Equation with its constraints, the optimum Lagrange multipliers
are used to compute the matrix w for all neurons as depicted in Equation 9.
For more details, please refer to [?] and [35].
w =
m∑
k=1
αkykx
k (9)
However, after performing our experiments, the feature input vectors are
not linearly separable. To solve this problem, different kernel techniques can
be used along with the SVM to map the input vectors into higher dimensions
using a non-linear mapping function in order to make them linearly separable.
The result is a feature space φ(x) of the input vectors. Introducing the feature
space function into Equation 7, the objective function can be rewritten as in
Equation 10.
J(α) =
m∑
k=1
αk − 1
2
m∑
k=1
m∑
j=1
αkαjykyjφ(x
k)Tφ(xj) (10)
A kernel function notation k(xk,xj) = φ(xk)Tφ(xj) can be used in Equa-
tion 10, which results in Equation 11 [36] [37].
J(α) =
m∑
k=1
αk − 1
2
m∑
k=1
m∑
j=1
αkαjykyjk(x
k,xj) (11)
We have used different kernel functions (feature mappings) and the best
results were achieved by the Radial Basis Function (RBF) kernel. The RBF
kernel is depicted in Equation 12. SVMlight tool was used in our experiments
which provides different kernels [38].
k(xk,xj) = exp(−γ ∥∥xk − xj)∥∥2) (12)
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6 Evaluation
IBM SPSS tool was used for both MLP and RBF neural networks under
Windows 10 platform machine. For SVM, we have used SVMlight tool under
Ubuntu 18.04 LTS machine. The tool provides different kernel implementations
[38]. The dataset for conducting the experiments is described in subsection 6.1.
Subsection 6.2 discusses the performance of different ANN techniques.
6.1 The dataset
For the evaluation of PASSVM, and taking into consideration that our system
relies on information provided by Censys search engine about IP addresses
that correspond to fast flux domains, and because Censys started to provide
access to their daily IPv4 full address scans since late 2017, we restricted our
fast flux dataset to includ only fast flux domains that have appeared during
2018 and 2019. In this work, we mainly collected fast flux domains that were
active during April 2018 to January 2019. To achieve this goal, a seed of 80
confirmed fast flux domains were collected manually from recently published
papers [39] [11]. In addition, some domains appeared in recent tweets about
new fast flux domains. Then, we performed active DNS lookup for every unique
domain name in the initial list using the Linux dig utility for a period of two
months. Based on the DNS response messages of the DNS lookups, the list of
the IP addresses of the domain names were extracted. For each IP address that
was resolved from the initial fast flux dataset, a query to VirusTotal [40] was
performed in order to get an updated list of the domain names that had been
resolved since April 2018 along with the date associated with each domain
name. After that, for each domain name, a query is sent to VirusTotal get the
list of the IP addresses that were resolved for the the associated domain names
and their dates. In total, we were able to obtain 5062 fast flux domains. The
dataset of the legitimate domains were obtained by performing active DNS
query for Alexa’s top 1 million domains [41]. Then, we filtered the domain
names and included only domains with 5 or more IP addresses in their DNS
response messages. The result is a dataset of 3087 legitimate domain names
and their corresponding IP addresses.
For each domain and its corresponding IP addresses in the aforementioned
datasets, a query is submitted to Censys search engine using APIs. The results
are received as JSON objects similar to the example shown in Figure 9. These
objects were parsed out to get the information of interest such as the number
of distinct port numbers, the number of IP addresses, the number of countries,
cities, etc. Moreover, we used the geolocation database available at [13] to get
the ASN numbers and the countries that are associated with all of the IP
addresses of a given domain name.
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Fig. 9 A sample of a JSON object returned by Censys
6.2 Performance Evaluation
The proposed PASSVM system has been evaluated using Multilayer Percep-
tron (MLP), Radial Basis Function Network (RBF), and Support Vector Ma-
chines (SVM) as described in Section 5. The feature selection is considered as
an important step in training artificial neural networks. Therefore, the normal-
ized importance of the different fast flux network features is considered in our
study and was evaluated during the training experiments. Hence, the normal-
ized importance of features for MLP network and RBF network are shown in
Figure 10 and Figure 11, respectively. Based on Figure 10, it can be noted that
the DomainLength, Regions, and Ports have the highest importance. However,
for RBF network, the features IPCount, IPs, TTL and Ports have the highest
importance as shown in Figure 11. This strongly suggests that all the selected
features that we have chosen in this study are important and play a major role
in distinguishing fast-flux domains from legitimate domains. It also provides
an evidence that the two newly introduced features (the number of open ports
and the IP ratio) are of high importance to achieve highly accurate domain
name classification.
We have performed several experiments to evaluate the performance of the
different ANNs using the 10-fold cross-validation method in order to obtain
the training model. In every run of the experiment, about 90% of the dataset
is trained, and 10% of the dataset is tested. Results show that the Support
Vector Machine with RBF kernel outperforms other ANNs with an accuracy
of 99.557 as shown in Figure 12. Table 2 compares the accuracy, false positive
rates, and false negative rates of the different classifiers. It can be seen that
SVM with RBF kernel has the highest performance in terms of accuracy and
false negative rate with a very low false positive rate. Such a very low false
negative can be cached in a lookup table for a practical adaptation PASSVM.
It is important to point out that the overall average execution time of this
classifier for training and testing does not exceed 40 ms, and the average time
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Fig. 10 Normalized weight of features in MLP Network
Table 2 Comparison of different ANN classifiers
Classifier Accuracy FPR FNR
SVM (RBF Kernel) 99.557 0.008 0.004
RBF (Softmax) 97.4 0.0058 0.1001
RBF (Guassian) 96.5 0.0066 0.1284
MLP 99.0 .0048 0.0483
to test one DNS record was less than 18 ms. After the comparison with other
ANN algorithms, SVM with RBF kernel is chosen because of its practicality
in performing very fast and highly accurate fast flux detection.
6.3 Comparison with the state-of-the-art
Table 3 presents a comparison between the proposed PASSVM system, which
is based on SVM with RBF kernel, with the state-of-the-art mechanisms for
fast flux detection. The mechanisms include GRADE [42], FF-Hunter [12],
FluxBuster [43] and [39]. The comparison criteria are based on whether the
detection is performed online or offline, the capability of performing a detection
based on a single DNS record, the time for training and testing, the accuracy,
and the used memory that were reported by the authors of the methods.
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Fig. 12 The accuracy of different ANN techniques
As shown in Table 3, PASSVM has the best performance in terms of time,
accuracy, and used memory. Also, it has the capability of performing online
fast flux detection based on a single DNS packet given that the system is
trained in advance. This allows for the detection of new fast flux domains as
they appear in the wild when users tries to access them. Hence, PASSVM
can be used by organizations to provide a passive online fast flux detection. In
addition, the system AI-model can be trained again and again as more dataset
becomes available to enhance its accuracy.
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Table 3 Comparison with the state-of-the-art systems
Algorithm Online? Single Packet Detection? Time used (s) Accuracy Used memory (MB)
GRADE [42] yes yes 30.48 98.47 85.34
FF-Hunter [12] yes NO 43.87 98 92.71
FluxBuster [43] No NO 198.45 99.4 102.32
Zang, Gong, Mo, Jakalan, Ding [39] yes NO 32.71 99.1 105.64
PASSVM yes yes 0.04 99.557 40.00
Previously proposed systems take more time to classify a domain name
because they require features that should be obtained from different Internet
sources rather than from local databases. For example, GRADE performs the
fast flux detection task based on the entropy of domains proceeding nodes for
all A records, and the standard deviation of the round trip time for all of the
A records. This requires performing tracerout and real-time measurement of
the round trip time for all of the records, which incurs high overhead and has
a major problem of possible failure due to filtering of the ICMP messages.
The system proposed in [39] analyzes live traffic that is collected from the up-
per DNS hierarchy by applying literal composition to identify DGA-generated
domains. Then it clusters the domains based on their literal features and the
edit-distance. Extreme machine learning (EML) is used to classify the domain
clusters into fast-flux domains and legitimate domains based on different fea-
tures that require active query of the whois database. Some of the 14 features
that were used in FF-Hunter require collecting a large number of DNS records
for a given domain, which means that it can not perform detection based on
a single DNS record as it takes extra time to collect the required features.
FluxBuster [43] relies on characteristics that are obtained from passive DNS
traffic traces, in addition to active data collection in order to accurately per-
form domain names classification. Moreover, it does not provide fast detection
and requires the collection of a large number of DNS records for each domain.
7 Conclusions
Fast flux service networks provide Internet adversaries with the capability to
hide their malicious servers while maintaining a high availability. There is a
pressing need to identify fast flux networks in a short time in order to mini-
mize the risk of accessing malicious websites and hence spreading malware. In
this paper, a novel AI-based online fast flux detection system is proposed. The
proposed PASSVM system applies artificial intelligence algorithms to identify
fast flux domains based on features that are associated with a single DNS
record. The features are obtained directly from the record itself, in addition to
information that is available in local databases. The databases information are
obtained from the Censys search engine and IP geolocation service. PASSVM
system performs online fast flux detection with high accuracy. Experimental
evaluations demonstrate that SVM with RBF kernel outperforms other arti-
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ficial neural networks and achieves high accuracy of 99.557% with a low false
negative rate of 0.4%. Such a low rate can be cached in a lookup table for prac-
tical adaptation of the system in order to achieve a zero rate. Compared with
the state-of-the-art fast flux detection systems, PASSVM achieves the best
performance in terms of accuracy, time, and used memory. Also, the system
approach makes it practical to be employed within organizational networks
so that employees do not access malicious domains, and hence it prevents the
spread of malware infections.
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